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 WE THE PEOPLE: EACH AND EVERY ONE 
 
RANDY E. BARNETT* 
 
 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
“We the People” is a powerful trope—so powerful that it has propelled three 
books of that title by the distinguished Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman, with 
a fourth and final one on the way. In this series, Ackerman has presented a novel 
thesis. We the People can amend the written Constitution by means other than 
those provided by Article V and, what’s more, the People have done so more than 
once. The first amendment took place during the New Deal in the 1930s and 40s, 
and the second during the Second Reconstruction in the 1950s and 60s. 
By this maneuver, Ackerman does not challenge head-on the method of 
constitutional interpretation known today as “originalism,” which specifies simply 
                                                 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center; Director, 
Georgetown Center for the Constitution.  This essay was prepared for the Yale Law Journal 
symposium on “The Meaning of the Civil Rights Revolution.”  I thank Jason Kestecher for his 
research assistance. 
ABSTRACT: In his book series, We the People, Bruce Ackerman offers a rich 
description of how constitutional law comes to be changed by social movements.  
He also makes some normative claims about “popular sovereignty,” “popular 
consent,” “higher law,” and “higher-lawmaking.”   In this essay, I examine these 
claims and find them to be both highly under-theorized and deeply problematic.  
Ackerman’s own presentation of what he considers to be an informal process of 
constitutional amendment illustrates the importance of formality in protecting the 
rights retained by the people.  And he assumes a collective conception of popular 
sovereignty without considering the serious normative problems raised by 
majority and supermajority rule.  Rule by a majority or supermajority is not the 
answer to the problem of constitutional legitimacy; it is the problem that requires 
a normative solution.  As an alternative to collective or majoritarian conceptions 
of popular sovereignty, I identify an individualist conception that yields 
fundamentally different conclusions about the purpose of a written constitution, 
including the importance of written amendments in safeguarding the rights 
retained by a sovereign people, each and every one. Finally, in a Postscript I 
respond to Professor Ackerman’s reply to this essay. 
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that the meaning of the Constitution should remain the same until it is properly 
changed. Not only does he accept the original meaning of the text of the 
Constitution as enacted, he claims the title of “originalist” for himself. “Scalia and 
Thomas call themselves ‘originalists,’” he writes, “but they are wrong in doing so. 
I am the originalist, not they.”1 He thinks he can do this because the text of the 
Constitution has supposedly been properly amended outside of Article V through 
exercises of so-called “popular sovereignty,” ratifying a deviation from the 
original text. He then can claim to be adhering to the original meaning of the 
Constitution as amended more faithfully than those who today call themselves 
originalists. 
Ackerman’s three books can be read at two levels. The first is a deeply 
insightful description of how constitutional law has changed since the Founding, 
and why. They present a richly detailed story of the mechanisms by which the 
Supreme Court eventually bends to the demands of social movements and 
changes its doctrines to accommodate legislation that the Court would previously 
have deemed unconstitutional. Ackerman provides an incisive explanation of how 
constitutional law came to accommodate the exercise of legislative power, both 
state and federal, formerly considered at odds with the Constitution’s text. 
Continually shadowing the level of description and explanation, however, is 
another level of normativity and legitimacy. Ackerman persistently claims more 
than to be presenting an accurate and informative narrative of the evolution of 
constitutional law; he justifies this evolution as a normatively legitimate 
expression of “popular sovereignty.” On his account, “We the People” have 
properly amended the text of the written Constitution through a complex 
interaction of the Congress, President, and Supreme Court, ratified by elections. 
With Volume 3, we are now told that this process is not only complex, it is also 
highly variable, as no two informal constitutional amendments are made in quite 
the same manner. After describing these varying mechanisms, he then proposes 
his interpretation of the true “original” meaning of these unwritten constitutional 
amendments. 
One can accept Ackerman’s series on one of these two levels without 
accepting it at the other. One can learn much from his marvelous narrative of the 
evolution of constitutional law without being persuaded by his effort to justify it 
as legitimate constitutional change. In this essay, I will not challenge his story 
and, for present purposes, will grant its accuracy. Instead, I will challenge his 
                                                 
1 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 329 (2014) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS]. 
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normative claim that changes in constitutional law have effected a legitimate 
amendment to the Constitution itself. While its lack of theoretical specificity is 
enough to find it unpersuasive, I will do more. I will also identify an alternative 
conception of popular sovereignty that explains why Ackerman’s appeal to “We 
the People” is misplaced. 
 
I. ACKERMAN’S UNDERSPECIFIED NORMATIVE CLAIM 
 
“We the People” appears sixty-four times in the text of We the People: The 
Civil Rights Revolution. “Popular sovereignty” appears fifty-eight times. “Popular 
consent” appears seven times.2 The phrases “higher law” or “higher lawmaking” 
appear twenty-four times. Given the centrality of these concepts to the title and 
thesis of the book, one would expect they would be carefully defined. Indeed, 
offering a definition would seem to be the least that a theory of legitimate 
constitutional change must deliver before advancing a normative claim. Yet, 
because none of these phrases is defined, we are left to piece together their 
meanings. 
We can start with this passage early in the book that utilizes all four phrases: 
 
Popular sovereignty isn’t a myth. The Founders developed a distinctive form of 
constitutional practice which successfully gave ordinary (white male) Americans 
a sense that they made a real difference in determining their political future. This 
Founding success established paradigms for legitimate acts of higher-lawmaking 
that subsequent generations have developed further. Reconstruction 
Republicans, New Deal Democrats, and the Civil Rights leadership once again 
confronted the task of winning broad and self-conscious popular consent for 
their sweeping transformations of the constitutional status quo—and each time, 
they (more or less) succeeded. The challenge is to analyze the concrete ways in 
which the evolving constitutional system tested their claims by requiring them to 
return repeatedly to the voters to earn the very special authority required to 
create a new regime in the name of We the People.3 
 
It is difficult enough to claim popular consent to rule; it is exponentially more 
difficult to claim “the very special authority required to create a new regime.” In 
We the People: Foundations, Ackerman does explicate the claim of constitutional 
revolutionaries to supplant one regime by another, even if doing so was outside 
                                                 
2 Other related terms include “mandate” (eighty) and “popular mandate” (fifteen). 
3 ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 3 (emphasis added). 
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the formal rules of the previous regime.4 But this is an entirely different matter 
than claiming that the formal mechanisms for amending the regime can be 
ignored while professing to remain within it.  
In this regard, the precise nature of Ackerman’s claims throughout the three 
volumes is ambiguous. On the one hand, he quite clearly claims that the adoption 
of the Republicans’ Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments was as genuinely a 
revolutionary regime change as the replacement of the Articles of Confederation 
with the Federalists’ new Constitution. To this end, like others today and 
Democrats back then, he has emphasized the “unconventional” or illegal nature of 
the ratification processes for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments.5 This 
move is in service of his contention that the “New Deal Revolution” represented a 
revolutionary regime change in this sense. Presumably, so too was the “Civil 
Rights Revolution” (though I did not find this claim quite so clearly presented in 
Volume Three).  
On the other hand, a more moderate claim also seems to pervade the work: 
that the formal amendment procedures of Article V were themselves informally 
amended by the Thirty-Ninth Congress, and that this new informal amendment 
process of “higher-law making” was utilized again during the New Deal and 
Second Reconstruction. According to this claim, the regime was not replaced by 
an extra-legal revolution, as the regime governed by Articles of Confederation 
was supplanted by a new regime governed by the Constitution. Instead, the 
existing regime was simply informally amended or modified, as the Republicans 
had innovated in the nineteenth century while otherwise remaining within it. 
Indeed, to the extent that the Republicans had merely amended the amendment 
process of Article V, there is nothing particularly “revolutionary” about later 
using the new informal process of constitutional amendment to make further 
changes.  
So which is it?  Have we had four “regimes” since the Articles of 
Confederation, like the French have had five republics?6 Or did the Republicans 
                                                 
4 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 169-179 (1991) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (discussing the theory of constitutional revolution identified in The 
Federalist). 
5 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 141-150 (1998) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (discussing the “unconventional” ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment); id. at 230-32 (describing Congress’ “blatant[]” refusal to respect the structure of 
Article V). 
6 See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 34 (characterizing as a “Bicentennial Myth” that 
“the French have run through five republics since 1789,” while “we have lived in only one”). 
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in the Thirty-Ninth Congress merely informally amend Article V to allow for 
further informal amendments to the existing regime? It makes a difference, for 
one can hardly claim that the American people have “self-consciously”7 engaged 
in the higher-lawmaking of replacing one regime with another if the fact of 
regime change was kept from them. Unlike the Founding, when the revolutionary 
nature of the change was made clear by Congress’s referring the matter to 
conventions in the states, this was never the claim made on behalf of these later 
changes at the time they were being debated.   
On the other hand, to make out the more modest claim that the New Deal and 
Second Reconstruction marked changes to constitutional law akin to the formal 
amendments achieved by the Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 
Ackerman merely needs to show that, under the amended amendment procedures, 
a super-majority of the American people have yet again informally amended the 
Constitution rather than replaced regimes. For all the talk of revolution, this far 
more modest claim seems to do much of the work in his narrative.   
With this in mind, let us stipulate that Ackerman is trying to mimic the super-
majoritarian requirements of Article V with other super-majoritarian procedures 
of higher-lawmaking. Of course, the principal objection to Article V is that its 
procedures are too onerous to keep the Constitution in tune with the exigencies of 
the times.8 For this reason, Ackerman desires a lesser level of popular support; 
otherwise he would be content with Article V as written. Yet, while he insists that 
mere majoritarian sentiment cannot suffice as “higher-lawmaking,” the 
appropriate quantity and composition of super-majoritarian support for legitimate 
regime change is never specified. 
Say what you will about the difficulties of Article V, at least it specifies the 
super-majority it requires for changing the Constitution, so everyone knows the 
threshold in advance. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                 
7 See infra note 9 (identifying where Ackerman claims that higher-lawmaking must be “self-
conscious”). 
8 This may well be true, in which case, for reasons I will make clearer in what follows, the solution 
is to modify the amendment procedures in writing. The issue here is not whether to make the 
process of amending the Constitution easier, but whether the text of the written Constitution 
should be amended informally. 
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In the passage just quoted, Ackerman also says that “popular consent” to 
“sweeping transformations of the constitutional status quo” must be “self-
conscious.”9 In other words, the requisite supermajority must know they are 
changing the Constitution when they vote, say, for FDR, LBJ, or for their Senator 
or Representative who then “ratifies” the vision of these Presidents by voting for 
what Ackerman calls “landmark statutes”10 or “super-statutes.”11 Sometimes, 
however, he changes who must self-consciously assent,12 and to what.13  How 
seriously can we take these normative claims for “the very special authority 
                                                 
9 Ackerman repeatedly insists on the “self-conscious” nature of popular consent to constitutional 
change. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 3-4 (“We the People followed 
Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats step-by-step as they built new systems of 
popular sovereignty to win broad and self-conscious popular support for their transformative 
initiatives.”); id. at 11 (“[T]he President and Congress, with the critical assistance of Martin 
Luther King . . . self-consciously repudiated the idea that Article Five should monopolize higher 
lawmaking—choosing instead to use their landmark statute to function as an engine of 
constitutional change in the name of the American people.”); id. at 28 (“Since the Civil War, 
[Americans] have given decisive and self-conscious support to national politicians and their 
judicial appointees to redefine constitutional values through landmark statutes and super-
precedents.”); id. at 320-21 (“[T]he Court, Congress and the Presidency worked with one another 
to express the self-conscious decision by ordinary Americans to move the Second Reconstruction 
far beyond the constitutional principles of the nineteenth century.”); id. at 330 (contending that, in 
Shelby County, Chief Justice Roberts “struck down a key provision of the Voting Rights Act . . . 
without even noticing that the American people . . . self-consciously repudiated the application of 
his asserted principle to voting rights.”). 
10 See id. at 33-34 (“Though the notion of a superprecedent has become familiar, we have not yet 
begun to consider seriously whether landmark statutes also deserve a central place in the modern 
constitutional canon. This will be a central thesis of this book.”); id. at 34 (proposing to “grant full 
constitutional status to the landmark statutes of the civil rights revolution”).  
11 Ackerman borrows the term “super-statute” from WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A 
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES (2010). See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 34.  
12 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 92 (“Congress . . . self-consciously 
displac[ed] Article Five with the modern higher lawmaking system based on landmark statutes and 
judicial super-precedents.” (emphasis added)); id. at 119 (“The civil rights leadership . . . self-
consciously assert[ed] Congressional authority to use the Voting Rights Act as a substitute for a 
constitutional amendment.” (emphasis added)); id. at 329 (“Martin Luther King Jr. and a 
bipartisan political leadership self-consciously designed alternative methods for constitutional 
revision.” (emphasis added)). 
13 See, e.g., id. at 61 (“[T]he American people gave their sustained and self-conscious consent to a 
series of landmark statutes marking an egalitarian breakthrough.” (emphasis added)); id. at 202 
(reporting that President Johnson “was prepared to provoke a ‘bitter civil rights fight’ to gain the 
broad and self-conscious support of the American people for another landmark statute” (emphasis 
added)). 
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required to create a new regime”14 when their content is so woefully 
underspecified? 
Say what you will about the difficulties of Article V, at least it clearly puts 
everyone, including members of Congress and the general public, on notice that a 
modification of the constitutional “regime” is on offer. 
 
* * * 
 
To the indeterminacy of the signal that a constitutional amendment is on offer, 
we can add the indeterminacy of the substance of the higher law that the People 
have supposedly ratified at a “constitutional moment.”15 In the end, it falls to, 
well, Bruce Ackerman to tell us what happened. That is the lesson of Ackerman’s 
sustained criticism of the lawyers’ received wisdom of the meaning of Brown v. 
Board of Education. He urges the “future generations [to] lift their eyes beyond 
the United States Reports to hear spokesmen for the people such as Lyndon 
Johnson and Martin Luther King Jr., Hubert Humphrey and Everett 
Dirksen . . . .”16 Future scholars should “reflect[] on their achievements” instead 
of “cast[ing] these leaders as tired epigones living off the constitutional heritage 
left by the giants of an ever-receding past.”17 
In other words, on Ackerman’s theory, the true constitutional meaning of the 
Second Reconstruction is what he urges in his book despite a lack of recognition 
even by legal professionals, much less the general public. How “self-conscious” 
can this constitutional transformation be if, fifty years on, specialists in 
constitutional law are unaware it happened? 
Say what you will about the difficulties of Article V, at least it clearly informs 
everyone of the terms of a constitutional change actually adopted. 
 
* * * 
 
Then there is the shifting mechanism of constitutional change. At least with 
his account of the New Deal, Ackerman seemed to present a recognizable—and 
presumably repeatable—process of presidential initiative, approved by an 
                                                 
14 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
15 A phrase Ackerman made famous in his earlier volumes, which is used fourteen times in his 
latest. 
16 Id. at 316.  
17 Id. 
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overwhelming proportion of Congress, and ratified by successive elections. Yet 
now we are told that “history never repeats itself—and the civil rights path toward 
popular sovereignty differed from the New Deal in key respects.”18 Sometimes 
change is initiated by the President, sometimes by the Court, and sometimes by 
Congress. Ackerman’s theory molds itself to fit the facts of any “constitutional 
moment” he proposes. 
Say what you will about the difficulties of Article V, at least it is specific about 
the alternative procedures by which constitutional amendments may be proposed 
and ratified. 
 
* * * 
 
Finally, and most remarkably, we now learn that popular sovereignty 
apparently can overcome the textual limits on government power but cannot 
supply any new ones. This peculiar feature of Ackerman’s theory of regime 
change does not emerge until he discusses massive popular resistance to the 
Supreme Court’s effort to impose forced busing as a means of integrating public 
schools. 
In a chapter called “The Switch in Time,” Ackerman chronicles the “popular 
mobilization”19 against the Court’s use of forced busing. “Gallup polls were 
confirming the hard-liners, showing 76 percent of Americans against busing, only 
18 percent in favor. Even blacks were sharply divided.”20 Without doubt, “the 
overwhelming majority of Americans were firmly opposed to the courts’ 
escalating busing campaign.”21 Indeed, “anti-busing sentiment was a significant 
force behind the tidal wave propelling Nixon to a landslide victory”22 in 1972. 
Ackerman never considers the possibility that this sustained popular and 
politically expressed resistance constituted another “constitutional moment” that 
established a constitutional line that the federal government cannot cross. Instead, 
he claims that “the American people were plainly disengaging from the intense 
struggle for black civil rights,”23 and that the civil rights “issue was returning to 
the realm of normal politics, where civil rights advocates no longer could credibly 
                                                 
18 Id. at 313. 
19 Id. at 283. 
20 Id. at 263. 
21 Id. at 264. 
22 Id. at 266. 
23 Id. at 286 (emphasis added). 
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claim that the mobilized majority of ordinary Americans were on their side.”24 
Just three pages after describing the “popular mobilization” against forced 
busing,25 he characterizes this development as “the inexorable decline of 
constitutional mobilization by ordinary Americans.”26 Rather than conclude that 
there arose a “self-conscious” assertion of constitutional limits on the means by 
which integration can be achieved, he concludes instead that “[n]o great popular 
movement lasts forever” and that the constitutional moment for civil rights had 
“come to an end.”27 
These quotes are simply stunning coming from so ardent a proponent of 
popular constitutionalism. Ackerman is much too smart to have missed the fact 
that he just described in considerable detail—and to his credit as a scholar—a 
political tsunami of very engaged American voters opposing forced busing. So his 
remarkable description of this intense political mobilization as a “decline of 
constitutional motivation” can most charitably be interpreted as revealing his 
unstated view that “constitutional moments” only work to overcome textual 
restrictions on power, rather than provide new ones. Constitutional moments are 
like ratchets, and ratchets only go one way. 
Say what you will about the difficulties of Article V, at least it specifies a 
mechanism for constitutional change that can work to decrease as well as 
increase the power of government. 
 
* * * 
 
In the end, we are left to ask what the term “constitutional” adds to 
Ackerman’s captivating account of the political power that winning social 
movements have quite obviously achieved. In what sense are these gains in power 
entitled to any additional “legitimacy” beyond the acquiescence that is given to 
the positive law? Why don’t these successful assertions of power just have the 
political force they have—until they don’t have it anymore? What does 
Ackerman’s thesis about “higher-lawmaking” add to that? 
                                                 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 283. Ackerman refers here to the “popular mobilization against [the Court’s] strong 
commitment to integration,” id. (emphasis added), but offers no evidence that this was opposition 
to anything other than forced busing. 
26 Id. at 286 (emphasis added). 
27 Id. at 286 (emphasis omitted). 
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I think I know the answer we are supposed to give to these questions. Once 
the limits on constitutional power contained in the written Constitution have been 
breached, we are supposed to accept that these limits are now gone forever. They 
can never “legitimately” be restored by a differently composed Supreme Court 
because the Constitution itself has now informally been “amended” to eliminate 
them from the text—the very same way that the Twenty-First Amendment 
repealed the Eighteenth. In short, Ackerman seeks for his informal amendments 
the same “lock in” that is sought by putting constitutional limits and guarantees in 
writing. 
Yet, it is one thing to claim, accurately, (a) that the Supreme Court’s 
previously existing constitutional law or doctrine provided a legal barrier to a set 
of politically popular policies, and (b) that this barrier was eventually overcome 
by a complex political process that led the Supreme Court to modify its doctrines 
to accommodate these policies. It is quite another to wrap this doctrinal change in 
the mantle of “higher law”—as connoted by the terms “super-precedent” and 
“super-statutes”—such that a future Supreme Court cannot legitimately confess 
error. 
No doubt, it might well take a political sea change for a future Court to feel 
moved to such a change—perhaps something similar to the intense political 
activity that precipitated the judicial departure from its previous doctrine. But 
Ackerman wants more than the natural stickiness of established doctrine. He 
wants to delegitimate any judicial deviation from the doctrines achieved during 
his “constitutional moments” as unconstitutional in the same sense as it would be 
unconstitutional for the Court to give California more than two Senators. 
Of course, one can object to the very idea of being bound by a written 
constitution.28 But the only serious objection to Article V in particular is that its 
procedures make changing our Constitution too hard. This may well be true. For 
reasons I have already suggested and will expand upon below, however, the 
appropriate solution to this problem is to modify the amendment procedures in 
writing.  
My difference with Ackerman and the “living constitutionalists” is not about 
whether to make the process of amending the Constitution easier, but rather about 
whether the text of our written Constitution should be amended informally. After 
                                                 
28 E.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2013) (contending that 
the Constitution should be treated as a piece of poetry to liberty and self-government rather than as 
binding law). 
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all, however “legally” the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment came to be 
ratified, both entered the written Constitution in written form.  
In this way, there is a sharp discontinuity between the Republican 
amendments of the 1860s—as well as the Progressive Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and 
Eighteenth amendments of the 1910s—and what transpired during the New Deal 
and the Second Reconstruction. An argument for informally ratifying new text 
does not, without much more, justify informally ratifying no text at all.  
 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH UNWRITTEN AMENDMENTS TO “THIS CONSTITUTION” 
 
In Part I, I enumerated several advantages to the “formal amendment”29 
process of Article V over Ackerman’s process of informal amendment. But in 
advancing these advantages of formalism, I need not to reinvent the wheel. In his 
famous 1941 article, Consideration and Form,30 the renowned Harvard contract 
scholar Lon Fuller identified the evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions 
of formality. Here is how Professors Calamari and Perillo summarized these three 
functions, while adding a fourth, the clarifying function: 
 
Formalities serve important functions in many legal systems. . . . Important 
among these is the evidentiary function. Compliance with formalities provides 
reliable evidence that a given transaction took place. A cautionary function is 
also served. . . . Before performing the required ritual the promisor had ample 
opportunity to reflect and deliberate on the wisdom of his act. . . . A third 
function is an earmarking or channeling function. The populace is made aware 
that the use of a given device will attain a desired result. When the device is 
used, the judicial task of determining the parties’ intentions is facilitated. A 
fourth function is clarification. When the parties reduce their transaction to 
writing . . . they are more likely to work out details not contained in their oral 
agreement. In addition, form requirements can work to serve regulatory and 
fiscal ends, to educate the parties as to the full extent of their obligations, to 
provide public notice of the transaction, and also to help management efficiency 
in an organizational setting.31 
 
                                                 
29 This term appears some twenty times in the book. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra  
note 1, at 3 (“Americans have occasionally used the formula for formal amendment laid out by the 
Founders in Article Five—under which Congress proposes, and state legislatures ratify, changes in 
our higher law.”).  
30 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). 
31 JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 238 (6th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).  
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All of these highly practical advantages are lost in a process of informal 
amendment of the sort Ackerman advocates. Lost as well is the benefit of having 
a written constitution to bind those who are given great power to govern the 
people. 
But that’s not all. Because the Constitution itself privileges its writtenness, 
more would need to be amended than Article V. So too would the oaths of office 
for all federal and state officers. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution in 
Article VI provides that “This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme law of the 
land; and the [j]udges in every [s]tate shall be bound thereby.”32 “This 
Constitution” is obviously a reference to the written Constitution in which the 
Supremacy Clause is contained. Article VI then continues by stipulating that: 
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the 
several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the 
United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to 
support this Constitution.”33 Again, the oath is to support the written Constitution. 
Living constitutionalists like Ackerman think that “the Constitution” is a 
broader concept, which may (or may not) include the text of the written 
constitution. As explained by Professor David Strauss, Supreme Court 
“precedents, traditions, and understandings form an indispensable part of what 
might be called our small-c constitution: the constitution as it actually operates, in 
practice. That small-c constitution—along with the written Constitution—is our 
living Constitution.”34 
But this claim is inconsistent with the text of Article V. The Constitution that 
is “the supreme law of the land” to which all federal and state officers swear to 
support is “this” one, the written one, not a small-c constitution provided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. This Constitution is the law that governs 
those who govern us. And “this Constitution” cannot serve this purpose if those 
who are supposed to be governed by it can, on their own, or in combination, 
change the rules that apply to them. 
                                                 
32 U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added). 
33 Id. (emphasis added). 
34 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 35 (2010). Ackerman is not as explicit as 
Strauss about this assumption of living constitutionalism. Cf. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra 
note 1, at 336 (“The Constitution is a work of many generations.” (emphasis added)). Although 
this sentence could be limited to subsequent formal amendments, it appears just before a reference 
to the “important contributions” of the Second Reconstruction, id., which were not included in the 
written Constitution. 
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Of course, it is true that “this Constitution” does not supply all the information 
that is needed to give it legal effect. In addition to constitutional interpretation to 
identify the communicative content of “this Constitution,” constitutional 
construction is often necessary to apply the communicative content of the text to 
particular cases and controversies.35 So the text itself may sometimes be 
supplemented by implementing doctrine that is true to its spirit as well as its 
letter. 
Ackerman is claiming merely to be supplementing the formal amendment 
procedures of Article V, which do not expressly claim to be exclusive of any 
other others. To make out this argument, he has appealed to the way that the 
Articles of Confederation were superseded by the Constitution without following 
the amendment rules therein. But there is an enormous difference between 
supplanting a previous regime and professing to amend or modify an existing 
regime while remaining within it. Moreover, not only are the amendment 
procedures specified in Article V implicitly exclusive, these procedures cannot be 
“supplemented” without overriding the passages that make “this Constitution”—
the written one—the “law of the land” and binding by oath on those who are to 
govern the People under its authority. 
To be clear, I am not making the circular or “bootstrapping” claim that the 
text of the Constitution is binding because the text of the Constitution says it is 
binding. Rather, I am claiming that those who pledge to be bound by “this 
Constitution” are publicly pledging to be bound by “this Constitution,” and “this 
Constitution” does not empower them to change it without going through the 
procedures of Article V. Like others who believe in the “living constitution,” 
Ackerman claims that “We the People” have changed “the Constitution.” He 
alludes to “the ongoing conversation that is our Constitution.”36 But what he 
cannot claim is that the People have informally changed “this Constitution.” That 
has only been done twenty-seven times. 
I deny that the Civil Rights Revolution, as Ackerman so wonderfully 
describes it, required a constitutional amendment to achieve. Although I accept 
the claim that the New Deal Court deviated from the original meaning of the 
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses—though never expressly to the 
degree claimed by modern progressives—I am unconvinced about the 
                                                 
35 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 453 (2013) (explaining the activity of constitutional construction and how it relates to the 
activity of constitutional interpretation). 
36 ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 36 (emphasis added). 
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“revolutionary” nature of the Second Reconstruction. True, the requirement of 
“state action” that seems to be stipulated in the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment37 was surpassed. But the Equal Protection Clause imposes on state 
governments an affirmative duty to provide the “protection of the laws” to all 
persons with their jurisdictions and to do so equally. This is a duty that can be 
breached by state inaction as well as by state action. 
More fundamentally, the Thirteenth Amendment is not limited by the state 
action requirement. This was a radical amendment aimed at the heart of the 
problems created by at least two hundred years of slavery.38 If Justice Harlan’s 
justly famous dissenting opinions in the Civil Rights Cases39 and Plessy v. 
Ferguson40 were correct, then there is a lot less to fear from the original meaning 
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments than its critics claim. 
This is a major claim that I am not in a position to vindicate here. Suffice it to 
say that advocates of “living constitutionalism” have an interest in bolstering their 
case by exaggerating the extent to which landmark civil rights decisions cannot be 
reconciled with the original public meaning of the text. So, for example, while 
Michael McConnell’s account of the extent to which Brown was consistent with 
the original meaning of the Constitution41 has not effectively been impeached,42 
neither has it knocked living constitutionalists from their posture of moral 
superiority.  
Suppose, however, that some now-popular aspects of the civil rights laws of 
the twentieth century were unauthorized by the original meaning of the formal 
civil rights amendments of the nineteenth. The fact would still remain that none of 
these “super-statutes” were sold to the public as amendments or changes to the 
written Constitution. Instead, the public was told at the time by these measures’ 
                                                 
37 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
38 As Ackerman notes, “Republicans were preparing to use the recently ratified Thirteenth 
Amendment as a platform for a series of landmark statutes vindicating the nation’s new 
commitment to equality.  It was only [President Andrew] Johnson’s repeated vetoes that forced the 
Republicans to make the Fourteenth Amendment their 1866 election platform. . . .” ACKERMAN, 
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 57-58.  
39 109 U.S. 3, 26-62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
40 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
41 Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 
(1995). 
42 Compare Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995), with Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist 
Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995). 
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proponents that they were entirely consistent with both the spirit and letter of the 
Constitution.43 Although there were undoubtedly legal academics, and perhaps 
some Justices, who believed otherwise, the Court has always denied that any of its 
decisions were so in conflict with the text as to constitute an informal 
amendment.44 
It is simply too late now to reinterpret the Court’s own jurisprudence after the 
fact to support a claim that the People “self-consciously” amended the 
Constitution when they merely accepted what they were repeatedly told about the 
constitutionality of these results. This Constitution cannot be informally amended 
nunc pro tunc.45 
 
III. THE PROBLEM WITH MAJORITARIAN POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Given its lack of conceptual specificity, Ackerman’s project gets its traction 
with readers by tapping into their commonly held intuitions of popular consent or 
popular sovereignty, by which the “will of the People” is expressed by either a 
majority or supermajority of the persons who make up the polity. This, however, 
begs the age-old question of what gives some subset of the polity the rightful 
power to bind the minority to its commands? In what manner does even a 
“mobilized” majority, or supermajority, get to speak on behalf of “We the People” 
as a whole? 
In my book, Restoring the Lost Constitution, I challenge this majoritarian 
conception of popular sovereignty as a fiction. Indeed, in my opening chapter, 
entitled “The Fiction of ‘We the People’: Is the Constitution Binding on Us?,” I 
begin by quoting historian Edmund Morgan: 
 
Government requires make-believe. Make believe that the king is divine, make 
believe that he can do no wrong or make believe that the voice of the people is 
the voice of God. Make believe that the people have a voice or make believe that 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., WALTON H. HAMILTON & DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN: THE 
CONSTITUTION—THEN AND NOW (1937).  
44 The case that comes closest to asserting the power to amend due to changed circumstances was 
the “Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case” of Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell. 290 
U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934) (“If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its 
adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be 
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, 
would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation.”). 
45 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (9th ed. 2009) (“[Latin ‘now for then’] Having retroactive 
legal effect through a court’s inherent power.”). 
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the representatives of the people are the people. Make believe that governors are 
the servants of the people. Make believe that all men are equal or make believe 
that they are not.46 
 
I then challenged “the idea, sometimes referred to as ‘popular sovereignty,’ 
that the Constitution of the United States was or is legitimate because it was 
established by ‘We the People’ or the ‘consent of the governed.’”47 I denied “that 
the conditions needed to make this claim valid existed at the time the Constitution 
was adopted or ever could exist.”48 Although “‘the People’ can surely be bound 
by their consent,” I claimed “this consent must be real, not fictional—unanimous, 
not majoritarian. Anything less than unanimous consent simply cannot bind 
nonconsenting persons.”49 Moreover, I contended that “if taken too seriously, the 
fiction of ‘We the People’ can prove dangerous in practice and can nurture 
unwarranted criticisms of the Constitution’s legitimacy. To understand what 
constitutional legitimacy requires, we must first consider what it means to assert 
that a constitution is ‘binding.’”50 
Constitutions are not, and do not purport to be, binding on the People 
themselves. Instead, they purport to be binding on those who make laws that are 
imposed on the People; and it is then claimed that, if a “legitimate” constitution is 
followed, the resulting laws will be at least prima facie binding on each person.  
Since unanimous consent is taken to be impossible to obtain,51 how does it come 
to pass that a majority or super-majority gets the authority to create a 
constitutional regime in which legislation is supposed to be binding on a 
dissenting minority? 
                                                 
46 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 11 
(rev. ed. 2014) (quoting EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 13-14 (1988)). Given this statement, it is curious that, 
in his cover endorsement of We the People: Foundations, Morgan says that Ackerman’s first 
volume “gives pragmatic meaning to government of, by, and for the elusive, invisible, inaudible, 
but sovereign people.” In other words, in Morgan’s terms, Ackerman’s book has either 
transcended the “make-believe” that “the people have a voice” to identify a genuine popular voice 
or, more likely, Morgan views Ackerman’s work as exemplifying the best and highest tradition of 
such inevitable make-believe. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 But, as I explain, it is only impossible to obtain unanimous consent to a monopolistic 
government governing a geographical territory. Unanimous consent to governance by 
nongeographically based authorities is both possible and commonplace. See id. at 39-43. 
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In essence, the majoritarian conception of popular sovereignty posits that, 
somehow, the minority has consented to be governed by the majority, and they 
cannot thereafter complain. Since the express consent of the minority to majority 
rule is never solicited, much reliance is placed on the concept of “tacit consent” to 
majoritarian rule. In my book, I then debunk each of the stories told to explain 
how this tacit consent is obtained based on voting, residence, the consent of the 
Founders, and general acquiescence.52 A theorist, like Bruce Ackerman, who 
places all his chips on the concepts of “popular sovereignty” and “popular 
consent” really must come to grips with the normative implications of his claims 
by specifying precisely who is governing whom, and by what right.   
In his first volume, Ackerman described what he called a “dualist” approach 
that, in some respects, is superior to more common appeals to majoritarian 
popular sovereignty. In contrast with what he calls a “monistic democracy” in 
which “[d]emocracy requires the grant of plenary lawmaking authority to the 
winners of the last general election . . . [and] all institutional checks upon the 
electoral victors are presumptively antidemocratic,”53 Ackerman denies that “the 
winner of a fair and open election is entitled to rule with the full authority of We 
the People.”54 Instead, he distinguishes “the will of We the People from the acts 
of We the Politicians.”55 
Ackerman posits a “dualist” constitution in which normal, validly enacted 
legislation is not confused with the “higher lawmaking” that “represents the 
constitutional judgment of We the People.”56 That appellation is limited to 
lawmaking initiatives that follow an “arduous obstacle course”57 designed to 
create a “deepening dialogue between leaders and masses within a democratic 
structure that finally succeeds in generating broad popular consent for a sharp 
break with the status quo.”58 
Ackerman’s dualism represents a refreshing and important improvement over 
what we might call the “simple” majoritarian fiction of popular sovereignty. To 
the extent that ordinary legislative “will” is decoupled from “We the People,” the 
                                                 
52 See id. at 24. I also critically examine nonconsensual theories of legitimacy. Id. at 25-28. 
Because, however, Ackerman is clearly asserting a theory of legitimacy based on popular consent, 
my critique of these theories does not apply to him. 
53 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 8. 
54 Id. at 9. 
55 Id. at 10. 
56 Id. at 9. 
57 Id. at 10. 
58 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Note the reliance here on “popular consent.” 
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danger posed by that fiction is greatly reduced. No longer is the process of 
systematically checking legislative rule seen as running afoul of the so-called 
“countermajoritarian difficulty.”59 
However much might be said for dualism as a descriptive account of how 
constitutional doctrine actually changes over time, in We the People: 
Transformations, Ackerman made clear that he thinks he has provided “a 
normative argument”60 that rests on the imperative of gaining the “considered 
support” of “We the People.”61 While denying the authority of “the People” to 
ordinary legislation, Ackerman ultimately claims that the result of “higher 
lawmaking” deserves to be called the will of “We the People.” 
In We the People: Foundations, he spoke freely and unselfconsciously of 
“principles of higher law validated by the People during their relatively rare 
success in constitutional politics”62 and of “fundamental principles previously 
affirmed by the People.”63 As he summarizes in We the People: The Civil Rights 
Revolution: 
 
Higher lawmaking in America is never a matter of a single moment; it is an 
extended process, lasting a decade or two, that begins when a leading 
governmental institution inaugurates a sustained period of extraordinary political 
debate, and it culminates with all three branches generating decisive legal texts 
in the name of We the People.64 
 
He now clearly claims that the amendment procedure of Article V has been “self-
consciously” displaced “with the modern higher lawmaking system based on 
landmark statutes and judicial superprecedents.”65 
                                                 
59 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962) (noting the judiciary’s role in checking political legislators). See 
generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2012) (arguing that the 
independent decisionmaking capacity of the Supreme Court has been constrained by the American 
public). 
60 ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 5, at 6 (1998). 
61 See id. (describing how dualism “prevents the political elite from undermining the hard-won 
achievements of the People . . . and mobilize[s] their considered support before foundational 
principles may be revised in a democratic way”). 
62 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 21. 
63 Id. 
64 ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 51 (emphasis added). 
65 Id. at 92. 
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But all this too is a fiction and, therefore, could not justify a duty of obedience 
in the citizenry. Although “the People” can be said to really exist—and can be 
characterized as the “sovereign,” as I shall suggest in the next Part—the people as 
a whole never speak, never rule, and never validate anything. Only some subset, 
whether a majority or minority of the whole, ever vote for or against anything. 
Even if those who support some constitutional change can somehow bind 
themselves (which I doubt), their votes cannot bind either dissenters or nonvoters. 
Consent simply does not work that way. For consent to justify authority, the 
person being commanded must himself or herself have consented. In a group of 
three people, a majority of two cannot consent for the third, unless the third has 
previously designated the other two as her agents. Even then, they cannot violate 
her inalienable—i.e., non-transferable—rights.66 
This leaves the normative question of constitutional legitimacy, by which I 
mean how individuals come to be bound to obey lawful commands because they 
are constitutional. To his credit, Ackerman sees the problem, which he addresses 
at the end of Volume One, in a chapter called “Why Dualism?” Indeed, in a 
crucial passage, he identified a “good enough” conception of constitutional 
legitimacy, which merits reproducing in full: 
 
The ultimate question is not whether this Constitution meets the standards of our highest 
moral ideals—no constitution in world history has ever come close—but whether it is 
good enough to warrant respectful and conscientious support. “Good enough,” in terms of 
the moral quality of its past achievements; “good enough,” in providing reasonable fair 
methods for resolving existing disputes; “good enough,” in opening up the future to 
popular movements that promise further political growth. If the existing tradition is good 
enough along those lines, we will make more progress by building upon it rather than 
destroying it. And it seems to me to provide a good enough reason to accept its claim to 
legitimacy.67 
 
I read Volume One before I published Restoring the Lost Constitution, in 
which the concept of “good enough” plays a central role in my treatment of 
constitutional legitimacy.68 In my personal copy of We the People: Foundations, I 
                                                 
66 See BARNETT, supra note 46, at 14-24. 
67 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 296-97 (emphasis added).  
68 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 46, at 98 (“[W]e may and probably should ignore or disregard a 
constitution that is not good enough in what is says to merit respect and adherence.”); id. at 112 
(“[W]e are bound by laws passed pursuant to the written Constitution only if what it says 
establishes lawmaking procedures that are good enough to impart the benefit of the doubt on the 
laws that emerge from the constitutional process.”); id. at 113 (“To repeat, if the original meaning 
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highlighted the passage above, and underlined the italicized portions of the last 
two sentences, while writing in the margin, “basis of legitimacy.” Having 
revisited Volume One to prepare this essay, I now suspect that I was influenced 
by this passage in ways that went unacknowledged in my later writings, so I am 
pleased for the opportunity to acknowledge it now. 
Yet whereas Ackerman’s approach to constitutional legitimacy rests on what I 
consider to the fiction of consent by “We the People,” let me now sketch another 
answer to this question based on a rather different conception of popular 
sovereignty that stresses instead the rights retained by the people, which I insist 
are quite real. 
 
IV. INDIVIDUAL POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND PRESUMED CONSENT 
 
In Restoring the Lost Constitution, I identify a path to legitimacy in which 
laws imposed on nonconsenting persons can be binding in conscience.69 For the 
“consent of the governed” to matter in the first instance, we must assume (and 
there is also good reason to conclude70) that “first come rights, then comes 
government.” As the Declaration of Independence stated: “We hold these truths to 
be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed, by their 
Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness.”71 It then affirmed: “That to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.”72 It is these “other” natural rights that the Constitution 
expressly describes in the Ninth Amendment as “retained by the People.”73 
The assumption that “first come rights, then comes government,” and that the 
first duty of government is “to secure” the rights retained by the People, helps 
                                                                                                                                     
of the Constitution is not ‘good enough,’ then originalism is not warranted because the 
Constitution is itself defective and illegitimate. This represents a rejection of the Constitution 
itself, not a rejection of originalism per se.”); id. at 322 (“If this original meaning creates a 
lawmaking process that is good enough to produce laws that are binding in conscience, then the 
original scheme is legitimate.”). 
69 See id. at 32-52. 
70 See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (2d ed. 
2014) (providing a normative defense for certain fundamental “natural” rights). 
71 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
72 Id. (emphasis added). 
73 See BARNETT, supra note 46, at 53-86 (discussing the natural rights “retained by the people” as 
liberty rights). 
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explain how lawmaking can be legitimate in the absence of consent. For a law 
would be just, and therefore binding in conscience, if its restrictions on a citizen’s 
freedom were (1) necessary to protect the rights of others, and (2) proper insofar 
as they did not violate the preexisting rights of the persons on whom they were 
imposed. 
The second of these requirements dispenses with the need to obtain the 
consent of the person on whom a law is imposed. After all, if a law has not 
violated a person’s rights, then that person’s consent is simply not required. The 
first requirement supplies the element of obligation. If a law is necessary to 
protect the rights of others, then it is obligatory for the person on whom it is 
imposed for the same normative reasons that the underlying rights are obligatory. 
In this way the pre-existing obligation to respect the rights of others supplies 
the duty to obey such a law. Laws can bind in conscience, at least prima facie, 
when promulgated by a legal system with procedural assurances that this standard 
is likely to be met. A constitution that provides such procedures can be called 
“legitimate.” A written constitution that binds lawmakers and law enforcers 
bolsters the reliability of these procedures. 
In the first edition of Restoring the Lost Constitution, I framed this 
nonconsensual source of constitutionality as superior to a majoritarian conception 
of popular sovereignty that fictitiously assumes the consent of the minority. Since 
it was published, however, I came to learn of an alternative to collective or 
majoritarian popular sovereignty that was in existence at the time of the 
Founding, a conception of popular sovereignty that is consistent with the 
approach to constitutional legitimacy I previously developed. This conception 
does not rest on the collective consent of a body of people—which in practice 
means consent by a majority of those who are allowed to vote—but is instead 
based on the individual sovereignty of each person.74 This conception of popular 
sovereignty, based on the consent of each and every person who is supposed to be 
bound by the laws, was most strikingly presented in the first great constitutional 
case to be decided by the Supreme Court: Chisholm v. Georgia.75 
 
                                                 
74 See id. at 361-69; Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and 
Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729 (2007)(describing the conception of individual popular 
sovereignty expressed by the justices in Chisholm v. Georgia). 
75 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
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A. Individual Popular Sovereignty76 
 
In Chisholm, the Supreme Court, by a vote of four to one, rejected the state of 
Georgia’s assertion of sovereign immunity as a defense against a suit in federal 
court for breach of contract brought against it by an individual citizen of another 
state. The majority concluded instead that members of the public could sue state 
governments because “sovereignty” rests with the people rather than with state 
governments. The Justices in Chisholm affirmed that, in America, the states are 
not kings, and their legislatures are not the supreme successors to the Crown. 
Justice James Wilson began his opinion by stressing that the Constitution 
nowhere uses the term “sovereignty.” “To the Constitution of the United States 
the term Sovereign, is totally unknown,” he wrote.77 There was only one place in 
the Constitution “where it could have been used with propriety,” he observed, 
referring to the Preamble. “But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have 
comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and established that 
Constitution. They might have announced themselves ‘Sovereign’ people of the 
United States: But serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious 
declaration.”78 
Wilson contended that if the term sovereign is to be used at all it should refer 
to the individual person. “[L]aws derived from the pure source of equality and 
justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, whose obedience they 
require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man.”79  
In other words, obedience must rest on the consent of the individual person who is 
asked to obey the law. Wilson believed that the only reason “a free man is bound 
by human laws, is, that he binds himself. Upon the same principles, upon which 
he becomes bound by the laws, he becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice, 
which are formed and authorised by those laws.”80 
For Wilson, then, states were nothing more than an aggregate of free 
individuals. “If one free man, an original sovereign,” may bind himself to the 
jurisdiction of the court, “why may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of 
                                                 
76 An expanded version of the material in this Section and the next will appear in Randy E. 
Barnett, The Judicial Duty to Scrutinize Legislation, VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming), which was 
the basis for my Seegers Lecture in Jurisprudence, given at the Valparaiso University School of 
Law in October 2013. 
77 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 454 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 458 (emphasis omitted and added). 
80 Id. at 456 (emphasis omitted). 
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original sovereigns, do this likewise? If the dignity of each singly is 
undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be unimpaired.”81 And he was not 
alone in locating sovereignty in the individual person. 
In his opinion in Chisholm, Chief Justice John Jay referred tellingly to “the 
joint and equal sovereigns of this country.”82 Jay affirmed the “great and glorious 
principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country, and consequently that 
fellow citizens and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each 
other in their own Courts to have their controversies determined.”83 Denying 
individuals a right to sue a state, while allowing them to sue municipalities, 
“would not correspond with the equal rights we claim; with the equality we 
profess to admire and maintain, and with that popular sovereignty in which every 
citizen partakes.”84 
Neither Wilson nor Jay’s individualist conception of popular sovereignty 
conforms to the modern notion of popular sovereignty as a purely “collective” 
concept. Their opinions in Chisholm present the radical yet fundamental idea that 
if anyone is sovereign, it is “We the People” as individuals, not Congress, state 
legislatures, or a majority of the citizenry. 
I am not claiming that Wilson and Jay’s conception of individual popular 
sovereignty stood alone at the Founding. Nor am I claiming anything about the 
original meaning of the Constitution to which, as Wilson observed, the term 
“sovereign” is “totally unknown.”85 Instead, I offer it to make sense of an 
approach to the “consent of the governed” that also existed at the time of the 
Founding—an approach that further supports the natural rights conception of 
constitutional legitimacy that I summarized above. 
If it is the people as individuals who are sovereign, and the people as 
individuals retain their preexisting rights, as is affirmed in the text of the 
Constitution by the Ninth Amendment,86 and if it is the case that the existing 
                                                 
81 Id. (emphasis added and omitted). 
82 Id. at 477 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
83 Id. at 479 (emphasis added). 
84 Id. at 473. 
85 Id. at 453 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
86 See generally, Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to a Textual-
Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937 (2008) (rejecting a “collectivist” 
interpretation of the “rights . . . retained by the people” to which the Ninth Amendment refers); 
Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX L. REV. 1 (2006) (“[T]he 
Ninth Amendment is what it appears to be: a meaningful check on federal power and a significant 
guarantee of individual liberty.”). 
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government lacks the express consent of every person, then we are faced with the 
issue of what the people could have consented to. Put another way, to the extent 
any government claims to be based on the consent of the governed without 
obtaining each person’s express consent, we need to ask to what each person 
could be said to have consented. 
 
B. Presumed Consent 
 
How then do we reconcile the individual conception of popular sovereignty 
based on the consent of each and every person with the fact that such unanimous 
consent to governance is never expressly solicited and would be impossible to 
obtain? As it happens, there is an oft-overlooked answer to this question that can 
be found at the time of the Founding and long before. If we start with the 
proposition that it is the people as individuals who are sovereign, and that they 
retain their preexisting rights unless they are expressly delegated to their agents, 
then in the absence of such express consent, we must ask to what each person 
could be presumed to have consented. 
In his 1845 book, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, Lysander Spooner 
contended that, since the consent of the governed “exists only in theory,”87 the 
people cannot be presumed to have given up their preexisting rights. “Justice is 
evidently the only principle that everybody can be presumed to agree to, in the 
formation of government.”88 But Spooner was far from the first to make this 
argument. 
John Locke, in his Second Treatise, observed that “men when they enter into 
Society, give up the Equality, Liberty, and Executive Power they had in the State 
of Nature, into the hands of the Society, to be so far disposed of by the 
Legislative, as the good of the Society shall require.”89 He then considered the 
scope of the legislative or police power that is given up, employing an analysis 
very similar to Spooner’s: 
 
                                                 
87 LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 153 (Boston, Marsh 1845).  
(“Our constitutions purport to be established by ‘the people,’ and in theory, ‘all the people’ 
consent to such government as the constitutions authorize.  But this consent of ‘the people’ exists 
only in theory. It has no existence in fact.”). 
88 Id. at 143. 
89 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 353 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (1690).   
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[Y]et it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve 
himself his Liberty and Property; (For no rational Creature can be 
supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the 
power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never be 
suppos’d to extend farther than the common good; but is obliged to 
secure every ones [sic] Property, by providing against those three defects 
. . . that made the State of Nature so unsafe and uneasie [sic].90 
 
Like Spooner, Locke asked what a “rational creature can be supposed” to have 
consented to, in the absence of any explicit consent, when leaving the state of 
nature to enter civil society. And the individual can only be supposed to have 
consented to the common good, which consists of the protection of each person’s 
life, liberty, and property. 
This idea of “supposed” or presumed consent appears again in Attorney 
General Edmund Randolph’s opinion on the constitutionality of a national bank. 
In addressing whether the power to incorporate a national bank is among the 
implied powers of Congress, Randolph observed that a legislature governed by a 
written constitution without an express “demarcation of powers, may, perhaps, be 
presumed to be left at large, as to all authority which is communicable by the 
people,” provided that such authority “does not affect any of those paramount 
rights, which a free people cannot be supposed to confide even to their 
representatives.”91 Once again, given the sovereignty of the people as individuals, 
the people cannot “be presumed” or “supposed” to have confided in their 
legislature any power to violate their fundamental rights. 
But perhaps the most striking use of this notion of the presumed or supposed 
consent of the governed appears in the 1798 Supreme Court case of Calder v. 
Bull. Calder has become known for its clash between Justices Samuel Chase and 
James Iredell. Chase’s opinion is famous for its assertion of “the great first 
principles of the social compact” that restrict the “rightful exercise of legislative 
authority,”92 and Iredell’s for its far grander conception of legislative power in the 
                                                 
90 Id. (emphasis omitted and added). The “three defects” to which Locke refers are the absence of 
standing laws, the want of an effective power to protect one’s rights, and the lack of an 
independent and impartial magistrate to adjudicate disputes. These three defects are ameliorated 
by the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government. 
91 EDMUND RANDOLPH, OPINION OF EDMUND RANDOLPH, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 86 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. 
Hall eds., Washington, Gales and Seaton 1832) (emphasis added). 
92 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
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absence of any express constitutional limit. Generally overlooked is the fact that, 
like Locke, Randolph, and Spooner, Chase too employs the notion of supposed or 
presumed consent. 
Justice Chase begins by providing examples of laws that violate these “great 
first principles,” such as a law “that punished a citizen for an innocent action,” or 
“a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens,” or “a law 
that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. 
and gives it to B.” He then contends that the enactment of such laws is beyond the 
legislative power because “it is against all reason and justice, for a people to 
entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed 
that they have done it.”93 
To be sure, the concept of natural justice or natural rights lurks in the 
background of all these considerations of “presumed consent,” but only as a way 
of interpreting the scope of legislative power in the absence of an express consent. 
When combined with the concept of individual popular sovereignty, all these 
invocations of “presumed,” “supposed,” or “theoretical” consent cast the issue of 
popular sovereignty and the “consent of the governed” in a new light that supports 
the approach to constitutional legitimacy I present in Restoring the Lost 
Constitution. 
We can separate the steps of this argument as follows: 
 
• First, sovereignty rests not in the government, but in the people 
themselves considered as individuals; 
• Second, to be legitimate, the government must receive the consent 
of all these sovereign individuals; 
• Third, in the absence of express consent by each person, however, 
the only consent that can be attributed to everyone is consent only 
to such powers that do not violate their retained fundamental 
rights; 
• Fourth, protecting these rights retained by the people assures that 
the government actually conforms to the consent it claims as the 
source of its just powers; finally 
• Fifth, only if such protection is effective will its commands bind in 
conscience on the individual. 
 
                                                 
93 Id. (emphasis added). 
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V.  RECONCEIVING ARTICLE V AS A CHECK ON THE GOVERNORS 
 
If sovereignty resides in each and every individual person, then two 
propositions follow: 
• The sovereign people themselves never rule. 
• But the sovereign people always require effective protection from 
those who do.   
The only way to justify rule by some subset of the sovereign people—whether a 
supermajority, simple majority, majority of a group of “legislators,” or a king and 
his court—is by providing effective assurance that the measures the rulers impose 
on the people as a whole do not violate the rights retained by any person or group 
of persons.  
In short, given the ultimate sovereignty of the people, majorities and super-
majorities are not the solutions to the problem of constitutional legitimacy; in a 
republican form of government, they are the problem to be solved. James 
Madison explained this quite clearly: 
 
But I confess that I do conceive, that in a government modified like this of the 
United States, the great danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in 
the Legislative body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled 
against that quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses 
the highest prerogative of power. But this is not found in either the Executive or 
Legislative departments of Government, but in the body of the people, operating 
by the majority against the minority.94 
 
In Federalist No. 10, Madison famously contended that the rights retained by 
the people are at risk from factions, be they a minority or majority of the whole. 
“By a faction,” he wrote, “I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting 
to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some 
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, 
or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”95 
Ackerman has shown how a concerted “mobilized” majority can overcome the 
structural and textual barriers on the powers of Congress contained in the 
Constitution. However, he has not addressed why we should believe that the 
triumph of this mobilized majority is always, or even usually, for the best. 
                                                 
94 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 437 (photo. reprint 
2003) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
95 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added). 
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Perhaps the ends were salutary, but were the means by which they were achieved 
dangerous to the rights of the minority? That question generally goes unasked, 
much less answered, in the We the People series. 
True, in Volume One, Ackerman reproduces a lengthy quotation from 
Alexander Hamilton, writing as “Publius,” on the need for judicial review to 
protect the “rights of individuals” and to guard against the “serious oppressions of 
the minor party in the community.” 
  
[The] independence of the judge is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of 
individuals from the effects of those ill humours which the arts of designing men, or the 
influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, 
and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate 
reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the 
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.96 
 
And he also includes this passage from Hamilton on how the Constitution is to be 
properly changed: 
 
Until the people by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the 
established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; 
and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their 
representatives in a departure from it prior to such an act.97 
 
Seemingly accepting the need for this judicial fidelity to the written 
Constitution, Ackerman responds that Hamilton “does not say that the judges 
should resist until the transformative movement satisfies all the legal rules for 
constitutional amendment that are contained in his new Constitution.”98 Rather, 
he “leaves open the relationship between these new rules and the kinds of ‘solemn 
and authoritative’ action that should convince the judges.”99 Really?  
I confess this strikes me as an informal amendment of what Publius is actually 
saying, one that elides the fundamental difference between extra-legal regime 
change and modifications of the existing regime, which I discussed at the 
beginning of this essay. Be this as it may, when invoking Hamilton’s assertion of 
judicial fidelity to the written Constitution as the guardian of individual rights and 
                                                 
96 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 193 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
97 Id. (quoting same). 
98 Id. at 195. 
99 Id. 
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the interests of minorities, Ackerman undermines this protection by expanding the 
ways a concerted majority can overcome the constitutional constraints upon it 
without addressing the impact for individual rights of this expanded assertion of 
majoritarian power.   
Just before the lengthy passage from The Federalist No. 78 that Ackerman 
quotes, Hamilton affirms that “the courts of justice are to be considered as the 
bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments.”100 Yet, put 
simply, the entire object of these three volumes is to legitimize permanent judicial 
acquiescence to assertions of congressional power that exceed the textual limits of 
the written Constitution, either by claiming the existence of a constitutional 
“revolution” or an informal constitutional “amendment” by “We the People.” 
None of his case for such change addresses the concerns for individual rights or 
the rights of the minority that a written constitution is enacted to protect and that 
Hamilton says the independent judiciary is tasked with enforcing.  
Nor can Ackerman defend his informal amendment process as merely 
providing an alternative appeal to “the solemn and authoritative” judgment of “the 
people themselves” that is provided by the written Constitution itself. After all, 
Article V does not purport to appeal to “We the People.” Instead it provides two 
alternative ways by which amendments proposed by a supermajority of Congress 
(or state conventions) can be ratified: by a supermajority of three-quarters of state 
legislatures, or by three-quarters of state conventions. Only the latter can be 
conceived, somewhat fictitiously, as the voice of the people themselves.101 
Although the Constitution itself was submitted for ratification to conventions in 
each of the states, the Constitution can be amended by a combination of Congress 
and state legislatures, not the people themselves. 
Viewed in this light, Article V is not a way for the people “to speak.”102 
Instead it can be more realistically viewed as yet another prudential “check” on 
government power, by recognizing a power in a different subset of the people than 
the one seeking to expand or modify its grant of power. If a written constitution 
provides the laws that govern those who govern the sovereign people, then the 
                                                 
100 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis 
added). 
101 See MORGAN, supra note 46, at 91 (“[T]he idea of an elected convention that would express 
enduring popular will in fundamental constitutions superior to government was a viable way of 
making popular creation and limitation of government believable.”). 
102 Cf. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 329 (“Scalia and Thomas suppose that Article 
V provides the only way that We the People can speak, and I reject their hyper-formalism as 
historically unjustified.”). 
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governors cannot on their own—even in combination with each other—safely be 
entrusted with the power to change the rules by which they govern the people. 
That power of change must reside in some other hopefully competitive body, like 
those of elected state legislators.   
Ackerman’s informal amendment procedures simply cannot claim greater 
legitimacy than the Article V procedures he seeks to supplement. Indeed, to 
override Article V’s countermajoritarian constraint on the will of the majority of 
the People, Ackerman appeals to the majority itself. In this, he misconceives the 
nature of popular sovereignty that includes each and every fellow citizen and 
joint-sovereign, and the purpose and function of Article V in safeguarding that 
sovereignty. 
This is not to say that Article V may not make amending the Constitution too 
difficult, which it may well do. But however the amendment process should be 
reformed, any new procedures should be debated and then implemented openly by 
means of a written text that, like the existing Article V, satisfies the evidentiary, 
cautionary, channeling and clarifying functions of formality.103  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In his series of fascinating and learned books, Bruce Ackerman has claimed 
that “We the People” are the sovereign. On that we can agree. He also claims that 
“We the People” can legitimately rule by speaking informally in the various ways 
he takes pains to describe. But this normative claim is not clearly specified, and is 
subject to several fundamental criticisms. It fails to appreciate the protection 
afforded to the rights retained by the people by formal constraints on powers. And 
it fails to offer any normative justification for rule by a politically mobilized 
faction. Upon closer inspection, Ackerman fails to present or sustain a normative 
argument for why a supermajority can legitimately override the text of the written 
Constitution that was put in place to protect We the People, each and every one. 
 
POSTSCRIPT 
 
In his remarks for this symposium, Professor Ackerman graciously responded 
to some of the criticisms of his project I make here, as well as offering his own 
criticisms of the conception of individual popular sovereignty and presumed 
consent that I propose. Ackerman writes: 
                                                 
103 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
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Professor Barnett’s appeal to Chisholm is flatly inconsistent with his originalist 
commitment to textualism. However inspiring he may find the opinions of Jay and 
Wilson, Americans of the Founding era emphatically disagreed. It took them only one 
year to mobilize in Congress and the states to enact the Eleventh Amendment which 
repudiated Chisholm and propelled the Constitution in a different direction…. 
Interpreting popular sovereignty on the basis of Chisholm is like interpreting citizenship 
on the basis of Dred Scott. Professor Barnett must choose: either he is a textual originalist 
or he is an advocate of social contract theory.  But not both.104 
 
In his reply to critics, Professor Ackerman rightly emphasizes that some of the 
criticisms advanced against his latest book were addressed in earlier volumes. In 
my discussion of Chisholm above, I similarly neglected to refer the reader to 
where I had previously considered and rejected the claim that the Eleventh 
Amendment “repudiated” the individualist conception of popular sovereignty 
articulated in Chisholm.105 In this Addendum, I do not present a full defense of 
my views, but seek instead to clarify just two points: (1) the Eleventh 
Amendment’s relationship to Chisholm, and (2) the relationship of my invocation 
of individual popular sovereignty to originalism. 
 
DID THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT “REPUDIATE” CHISHOLM? 
 
By invoking the Eleventh Amendment in response to my discussion of the 
conception of popular sovereignty in Chisholm, Ackerman has waded into deep 
and treacherous waters. In his reply, Ackerman is claiming that the highly 
technical language of the Eleventh Amendment construing Article III’s state 
citizen diversity106 should be read as a repudiation of the idea expressed in 
Chisholm that the people as individuals are sovereign. He offers no evidence 
whatsoever that the Amendment was so read at the time, and this reading of the 
text itself is so implausible as to border on absurdity. Indeed, if the Eleventh 
Amendment’s partial protection of state immunity from lawsuits in federal court 
really did replace the sovereignty of We the People with a state-based conception 
of sovereignty, the implications for Ackerman’s own theory would be devastating. 
                                                 
104 Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, __ YALE L. J. ___ (20134).  
105 See Barnett, supra note 74, at 1741-55 (discussing “why the Eleventh Amendment did not 
repudiate Chisholm’s approach to popular sovereignty”). 
106 See U.S. CONST., Amend. XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”). 
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Subtleties matter when considering the relationship of the Eleventh 
Amendment to the justice’s seriatim opinions Chisholm. For a start, we must 
carefully distinguish between two distinct positions. The first is the claim that the 
Court in Chisholm had incorrectly interpreted the original meaning of Article III 
and that, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment restored that original meaning. The 
second is that Chisholm was a correct interpretation of Article III and that, 
therefore, the Eleventh Amendment changed or qualified that original meaning. 
Ackerman is unclear whether he thinks the Eleventh Amendment changed or 
restored the original meaning of the text: “It took [Americans of the Founding 
era] only one year to mobilize in Congress and the states to enact the Eleventh 
Amendment which repudiated Chisholm and propelled the Constitution in a 
different direction.”107 Does this mean that the Eleventh Amendment took the 
Constitution in a different direction (change), or that the Eleventh Amendment 
took “the Constitution” of the Supreme Court in a different direction 
(restoration)? He does not say which. At moments like this, it is useful to be able 
to distinguish the meaning of “the Constitution” itself from the constitutional law 
of the Supreme Court, but Ackerman’s project elides this distinction, and here it 
shows. 
Then there is a second subtlety: Whether it was a restoration or a modification 
of the original meaning of Article III, did the original meaning of the Eleventh 
Amendment “repudiate” the principle of individual popular sovereignty 
announced in Chisholm in favor of a general unwritten principle of state 
sovereignty or, perhaps more narrowly, state sovereign immunity? Or did it 
instead merely do what it says and nothing more: insulate a state from suits in 
federal court by citizens of other states and of foreign nations. While the latter, far 
narrower, proposition has been endorsed by a broad swath of ideologically and 
methodologically diverse Eleventh Amendment scholars,108Ackerman is 
apparently endorsing the first of these readings.  
                                                 
107 Ackerman, supra note 104, at __ (emphasis added).   
108 See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: 
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1978) (arguing that sovereign immunity is a common law 
doctrine and not constitutionally compelled); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather 
than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983) (arguing that the 
Amendment does not cover federal question or admiralty jurisdiction); John J. Gibbons, The 
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.1889 
(1983) (arguing from a historical standpoint that the Amendment’s passage was primarily secured 
as part of a bargain to enforce the peace treaty); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in 
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As it happens, however, Chief Justice John Marshall did not agree. In a little-
noted passage of his opinion in Fletcher v. Peck,109 some twenty years after the 
Eleventh Amendment was adopted, he observed: “The Constitution, as passed, 
gave the courts of the United States jurisdiction in suits brought against individual 
States. A State, then, which violated its own contract was suable in the courts of 
the United States for that violation.”110 Marshall then concluded that, although 
“this feature is no longer found in the Constitution,” it nevertheless still “aids in 
the construction of those clauses with which it was originally associated.”111 In 
other words, according to John Marshall, Chisholm was a faithful interpretation of 
the original meaning of the Constitution at the time it was decided, and remained 
a correct reading of the general principles of our political institutions even after 
the text was amended to carve out a limited immunity for states. 
Given that Ackerman plays the Dred Scott card,112 it is ironic that he endorses 
the reading of the Eleventh Amendment that was first adopted by the same 
shameful post-Reconstruction Supreme Court that gutted the Republican’s 
revolutionary formal amendments. For it was not until the 1890 case of Hans v. 
Louisiana,113 decided just six years before Plessy v. Ferguson,114 that the 
Supreme Court first took the position that the Eleventh Amendment had 
repudiated its own decision in Chisholm. Like Ackerman, the Court in Hans  
asserted that the views of state sovereignty articulated by Justice Iredell in his 
solo dissent in Chisholm “were clearly right,—as the people of the United States 
                                                                                                                                     
Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 953, 1010 (2000) (arguing that “sovereign immunity is in some respects unjust” 
and “the Eleventh Amendment need not be understood to have endorsed that injustice as a general 
proposition”); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the 
Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998) (arguing that the Amendment represented 
a compromise on fiscal policy between the states and the federal government). 
109 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810). 
110 Id. at 139 (emphases added). 
111 Id. (emphasis added). 
112 See Ackerman, supra note 104, at __.  See also id. at __ (“There are only two other times in 
American history when a Supreme Court judgment has been self-consciously repudiated by formal 
amendment: the Fourteenth rejected Dred Scott; the Sixteenth, the Income Tax Cases.  Interpreting 
popular sovereignty on the basis of Chisholm is like interpreting citizenship on the basis of Dred 
Scott.”). 
113 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
114 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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in their sovereign capacity subsequently decided”115 when it enacted the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
This position was then reaffirmed and extended by the Rehnquist Court in 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.116 In his opinion in Seminole Tribe, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist quoted Hans with approval: “Although the text of the 
Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of 
the federal courts, ‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so 
much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’”117 Like 
Ackerman, Chief Justice Rehnquist excoriated the dissent for “relying upon the 
now-discredited decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.”118 
Not only does the text itself not support the conclusion that the Eleventh 
Amendment repudiated Chisholm’s view of popular sovereignty, to reach its 
conclusion, the Supreme Court needed to reject arguments based on the text:   
 
The dissent’s lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is directed 
at a straw man—we long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment is [quoting Hans] “to strain the Constitution and the law 
to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.”  The text dealt in terms only 
with the problem presented by the decision in Chisholm....119 
 
The Court’s modern Eleventh Amendment doctrine, seemingly endorsed by 
Ackerman as the original meaning of the Constitution, rests not on the “literal” 
text of the Amendment, but rather on what the Court claims to be its unwritten 
underlying “presupposition.”120  
To establish this unwritten principle, the Court in both Hans and Seminole 
                                                 
115Hans, 134 U.S. at 14. 
116517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
117Id. at 54. (emphasis added, citation omitted).  
118Id. at 68. 
119Id. at 69 (citation omitted).  
120Id. at 54. See also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) 
(“Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of §2 of Article III, or 
assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-
consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and 
control”); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 37 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Hans 
was not expressing some narrow objection to the particular federal power by which Louisiana had 
been haled into court, but was rather enunciating a fundamental principle of federalism, evidenced 
by the Eleventh Amendment, that the States retained their sovereign prerogative of immunity.”). 
Seminole Tribe reversed Union Gas. See Seminole Tribe, at 517 U.S. at 66 (“We feel bound to 
conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled.”). 
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Tribe employed the now-generally-rejected approach to originalism that is based 
on the original intentions of the framers or ratifiers, rather than upon the original 
public meaning of the text that was adopted.121 Justice Bradley’s opinion in Hans 
exemplifies a typical feature of original intent Proto-Originalism: its reliance on 
the counterfactual hypothetical intentions of the framers rather than on historical 
evidence of textual meaning.   
 
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to 
be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own State in the federal courts, whilst the 
idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled? 
Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a 
proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its own 
citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States can we 
imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is 
almost an absurdity on its face.122  
 
Even before I was an originalist, I dubbed this technique, “channeling” the 
framers.123 
Which leads to a second irony of Professor Ackerman’s invocation of Dred 
Scott. By appealing to the principles, “presuppositions” or “postulates” allegedly 
held by the relevant drafters or ratifiers to override the public meaning of the text 
itself, the Court in Hans employed the same type of hypothetical original intent 
reasoning used by Justice Taney in Dred Scott when he interpreted the meaning of 
“the People” in the Preamble and in the Declaration of Independence.  
 
It cannot be supposed that [the State sovereignties] intended to secure to [free blacks] 
rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body throughout the Union, which 
every one of them denied within the limits of its own dominion. More especially, it 
cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States regarded them as included in the 
word citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution which might compel them to 
receive them in that character from another State.124 
                                                 
121 Lawrence Solum has recently characterized the approach relying on the intentions of the 
framers or ratifiers as “Proto-Originalism,” as it preceded the rise of a self-conscious “originalist” 
movement and was superseded by original public meaning originalism as early as the 1980s. See 
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 
462-64 (2013). 
122 Hans, 134 U.S. at 15 (emphases added). 
123 See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of Framers’ Intent, 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 403, 405 
(1996). 
124Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416 (1857) (emphasis added).  
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This use of hypothetical original intent to narrow the meaning of the text of the 
Reconstruction Amendments later became a favorite technique of the 
Reconstruction Era Supreme Court, beginning as early as The Slaughter-House 
Cases.125 
 
WHY I WAS NOT MAKING AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT ABOUT POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Regardless of whether the individualist conception of popular sovereignty 
expressed by Justices Jay and Wilson in Chisholm v. Georgia was somehow 
repudiated by the Eleventh Amendment, by invoking their opinions I was not 
myself making an originalist argument. That is, I was not claiming that the 
individualist conception of popular sovereignty was somehow to be found in the 
communicative content of the text of the Constitution. Instead, I was making a 
normative argument about the conditions of establishing constitutional legitimacy. 
Or, more precisely, I was responding to the implicit normative argument made by 
Ackerman when he invokes the higher-lawmaking power of a super-majority of 
“We the People.” 
Rather than alleging the consent of majorities, super-majorities or states, I 
proposed using the “presumed consent” of individuals to reconcile the assertion in 
the Declaration of Independence that governments are instituted “to secure these” 
pre-existing individual, natural, and inalienable rights retained by the people with 
its assertion that such governments “deriv[e] their just powers” from “the consent 
of the governed.”126 The individualist conception of popular sovereignty 
articulated by Jay and Wilson reduces the tension between these two claims in a 
manner that today’s exclusive focus on collective popular sovereignty conceals.  
I then proposed that—as explained by Justice Chase in Calder, as well as by 
Locke and Edmond Randolph127—there are legislative powers to which it cannot 
be presumed that each and every person has consented, even if a majority or 
supermajority of the people so approve. The existence of the individual natural 
and inalienable rights retained by the people undercuts any claim that “the 
People,” considered as individuals, impliedly consented to a legislative power to 
violate these rights. 
                                                 
125 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
126 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
127 See supra, note 88-93, and accompany text. 
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But this is not an originalist argument. This is an argument about how to 
construe the scope of nontextual constitutional powers in a way that enhances 
constitutional legitimacy, by which I mean whether laws that are imposed on a 
nonconsenting individual by a given constitutional order are binding in 
conscience on that individual.128 It would be bootstrapping to claim that the 
constitutional order established by the founders’ Constitution was legitimate 
because it comported with the founders’ own conception of legitimacy based on 
their allegedly collective conception of popular sovereignty. 
It is true that, for over twenty-five years and beginning well before I myself 
was an originalist, I have contended that the original meaning of the 
“rights...retained by the people”129 in the Ninth Amendment was a reference to 
individual, natural, liberty rights and that, as a matter of positive constitutional 
law, such rights should not be denied or disparaged.130 But, while the normative 
claim that the legal order established by the Constitution is (or is not) legitimate 
must begin with its positive meaning, which I maintain is its original meaning, it 
cannot end there. In short, I never naively “base [my] preference for Locke simply 
because [sic] his Second Treatise influenced some leading Founders.”131  
For this reason, Ackerman’s characterization of my position as a “rejection of 
originalism”132 is a gross distortion. Unsurprisingly, I remain fully committed to 
originalism but argue, as I always have, for the legitimacy of the originalist 
constitutional order on normative grounds. The opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia 
demonstrate that individual popular sovereignty is deeply rooted in our 
constitutional tradition, but the normative legitimacy of the constitutional order 
must be supported by reasons that we can affirm here and now.  
                                                 
128 See BARNETT, supra note 46, at 32-52 (discussing constitutional legitimacy without consent). 
129 U.S. CONST. Amend IX. 
130 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11, 
27-32 (1988) (contending that the founders’ belief in natural rights should color our interpretation 
of Ninth Amendment even if we reject their stance); Barnett, supra note 86, at 10-82 (identifying 
five models of the Ninth Amendment’s original meaning, and evaluating each in light of the 
available evidence); Barnett, supra note 86, at 950-60 (connecting the original public meaning of 
the Ninth Amendment with the individualist conception of popular sovereignty); and Randy E. 
Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
615, 622-25 (2009) (responding to the argument that the Ninth Amendment is merely a rule of 
construction). 
131 Ackerman, supra note 104, at __. [eliminate “sic” if this sentence is corrected in editing of his 
piece] 
132 Id. at __. 
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As I have written, “if the original meaning of the Constitution is not ‘good 
enough,’ then originalism is not warranted because the Constitution is itself 
defective and illegitimate. This represents a rejection of the Constitution, not a 
rejection of originalism per se.”133 At the same time, I also insisted that “[s]hort of 
making the claim of illegitimacy, however, we are bound to respect the original 
meaning of a text, not by the dead hand of the past, but because we today—right 
here, right now—profess our commitment to this written Constitution, and 
original meaning interpretation follows naturally from this commitment.”134 
Nor do I offer a social contractarian normative defense of the natural rights 
retained by the people. Instead, I defend them at length on the ground that they 
are necessary to address the fundamental social problems of knowledge, interest, 
and power—problems that must somehow be addressed if persons are to pursue 
happiness while living in society with each other.135 My use of “contractarian” 
here and elsewhere reasoning is simply responsive to the commonplace claim that 
“the People” have somehow collectively, via a majoritarian decision-making 
process, “consented” to bind everyone.136 To this, I reply, “not so fast.” 
Indeed, it appears to be Ackerman who is invoking the authority of the 
founders to establish the legitimacy of his collective conception of popular 
sovereignty. “Once Professor Barnett abandons his ahistorical appeal to John 
Locke,” he chides, “his commitment to the original understanding requires him to 
consider whether my blow-by-blow description of these the latter-day 
transformations satisfy the principles of popular sovereignty established at the 
Founding.”137  
Ackerman is right that my “appeal to John Locke” is “ahistorical” insofar as a 
Lockean conception of natural rights (among others) contributes to our normative 
assessment of the legitimacy of the Constitution.138 But what Ackerman then 
                                                 
133 BARNETT, supra note 74, at 113. 
134 Id. at 114. 
135 See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (2nd ed. 
2014). 
136 And, given what I have discovered, in recent years I have become increasingly skeptical of 
historical claims that the founders’ “republicanism” was a collective or proto-socialist rather than 
basically individualist or liberal. Supreme Court justices make arguments they expect to resonate 
with their audience, which says something about the audience as well as the justice. But I am not 
in a position to prove that historical narrative wrong, which is why I sound this note in a footnote 
and not in the text. 
137 Ackerman, supra note 104, at __ (emphasis added). 
138 On the other hand, it is historical insofar is it helps identify the original meaning of the “rights 
… retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. Amend IX. 
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dismisses as “our philosophical disagreement”139 about the normative legitimacy 
of the constitution simply cannot be obviated by appeals to history. At some 
point, constitutional theorists who make claims about constitutional legitimacy 
must either offer cogent normative arguments, which I acknowledge is 
demanding, or at least candidly admit their normative assumptions for their 
audience to judge.  
In the end, in his monumental “We the People” series of books, Ackerman 
may or may not be describing accurately the positive constitutional law of 
informal constitutional change outside of Article V. For reasons given above, I 
say “nay.” But even Bruce Ackerman cannot derive a normative “ought” from an 
historical “is,” no matter how many volumes he writes. 
                                                 
139 Ackerman, supra note 105, at __. 
